FDI

Scorecard for Chinese Exporters to the US: Vietnam, India or Thailand?

Scorecard for Chinese Exporters to the US: Vietnam, India or Thailand?

A Chinese exporter selling to the US in 2026 faces the question: put the factory in Vietnam, India or Thailand? All three are “China + 1” destinations, but US tariff risk, localisation requirements, logistics costs and legal environments differ fundamentally across them. This article scores the three candidates on eight criteria — not to declare “which country wins”, but so exporters can score with their own industry’s weights: the right answer for electronics may not be right for furniture.

Criteria 1–3: US tariff risk

(1) How “targeted” by the US. Vietnam runs a large trade surplus with the US and has repeatedly faced US Department of Commerce (DOC) anti-dumping/countervailing investigations — wood, steel, solar panels and tyres set precedents. Thailand has investigation precedents at smaller scale; India faces fewer circumvention probes but confronts reciprocal tariffs under new US trade policy. Scores: India 7/10, Thailand 6/10, Vietnam 5/10 (highest probe risk, but also the most experienced at responding).

(2) Anti-circumvention risk. The DOC can investigate whether goods “from Vietnam/Thailand/India” are really Chinese goods in disguise — a circumvention finding extends China’s anti-dumping duties to the third country. This risk rises with the share of Chinese components and falls with the depth of local processing. Vietnam — where many Chinese plants do only final assembly — is scrutinised hardest. Scores: India 7/10, Thailand 6/10, Vietnam 5/10.

(3) Meeting rules-of-origin. To earn FTA preferences and to “stand up” to origin investigations, products need substantial transformation locally. Vietnam has the deepest supporting-industry clusters of the three for electronics and garments (a decade of FDI inflows), making localisation easier; Thailand is strong in autos and processed food; India’s huge domestic market absorbs output not shipped to the US. Scores: Vietnam 8/10, Thailand 7/10, India 6/10.

Criteria 4–6: cost and operations

(4) All-in production cost. Vietnam: competitive labour, industrial rents risen but still below Thailand’s; more reliable power than India. Thailand: costlier but best infrastructure. India: cheapest labour but high inland logistics costs and complex procedures. Scores: Vietnam 8/10, India 7/10, Thailand 6/10.

(5) Logistics to the US. Vietnam and Thailand both have direct ocean routes to the US West Coast across the Pacific; India ships via the Indian Ocean — slower and costlier, though closer to Middle East/European markets. For US-bound goods, geography is a hard advantage for Vietnam and Thailand. Scores: Vietnam 8/10, Thailand 8/10, India 5/10.

(6) Speed to factory. Vietnam: streamlined IRC procedures under Investment Law 143/2025, plenty of ready-built factories — leasing ready-built space and producing within 3–6 months is realistic. Thailand: clear BOI incentive system, stable procedures. India: large incentives but the slowest, least predictable land and licensing processes of the three. Scores: Vietnam 8/10, Thailand 7/10, India 5/10.

Criteria 7–8: legal environment and long-term strategy

(7) Friendliness to Chinese investors. Vietnam: large Chinese business community, smooth cross-border supply chains, short distance — easiest to manage from China. Thailand: neutral, long-established ethnic-Chinese community. India: tense China–India geopolitics, tight screening of Chinese investment (Press Note 3 — all investments from border-sharing countries need government approval). Scores: Vietnam 9/10, Thailand 7/10, India 4/10.

(8) Multi-market scalability. India wins decisively on its 1.4-billion domestic market — an Indian plant serves both US exports and local sales. Vietnam: 100-million domestic market, broad FTAs (EVFTA, CPTPP, RCEP) — easy exports to the EU/Japan/Korea. Thailand: ASEAN gateway, 70-million domestic market. Scores: India 9/10, Vietnam 7/10, Thailand 6/10.

The composite score — and how to use it

Adding eight criteria (out of 10): Vietnam 61/80, Thailand 54/80, India 50/80 — with equal weights. But never use equal weights: electronics exporters should double-weight criteria 3 (supporting clusters) and 5 (logistics) — Vietnam pulls further ahead; exporters wanting domestic sales plus US exports should double-weight criterion 8 — India climbs; circumvention-sensitive industries should double-weight criterion 2 — the gaps narrow. The “two-leg” strategy: many large Chinese groups no longer choose one — they put the main leg in Vietnam (US exports) and a hedge leg in India or Thailand (probe-risk diversification). Running two bases costs more to manage, but far less than having the entire chain hit with anti-circumvention duties.

Warning: today’s scores aren’t tomorrow’s

US tariff policy changes with administrations — duty levels and investigation lists can flip after each election cycle. These scores are a snapshot at writing (October 2026). Investors should: (1) refresh the scorecard quarterly; (2) design plants for origin flexibility (steadily raising localisation to “stand up” under any investigation scenario); (3) avoid pure “final assembly only” structures — that is precisely the profile anti-circumvention investigators look for. Final principle: there is no absolute winning country — only the best fit for each exporter’s product structure and risk appetite.

Using the scorecard in the boardroom — a facilitation guide

A scorecard only creates value if the right people argue over it. Run the scoring as a half-day workshop: invite operations (they know the real localisation ratio), finance (they own the landed-cost model), legal (they assess probe risk), and sales (they know what US customers demand on origin). Score independently first — each participant scores the eight criteria alone, then reveal the spreads: where scores diverge by 3+ points, that’s where the company’s real uncertainty lives, and the discussion should start there. Document the assumptions behind every score (e.g., “Vietnam 8/10 on logistics assumes Haiphong–Los Angeles direct sailings continue”) — when policy changes, you update the assumption, not the whole analysis. Re-run the workshop at three trigger points: when the US announces a new investigation in your sector, when your China-component share crosses 40% (the informal danger zone investigators watch), and annually before capex planning. Companies that treat site selection as a one-off decision get stranded by policy shifts; companies that treat it as a standing review move early and move cheap. The scorecard is not the decision — it is the discipline that makes the decision defensible to the board, the auditors, and, if it ever comes to it, the investigators.

Checklist: choosing a base for Chinese exports to the US

1. Map your current supply chain: what share of components comes from China? Which steps happen where? — the input for circumvention-risk assessment. 2. Score the eight criteria with your industry’s weights: double the most important, drop the irrelevant. 3. Check investigation precedents: has the DOC probed your product in the candidate country? With what outcome? 4. Assess supporting clusters: are there enough local suppliers to lift localisation to a safe threshold? 5. Compute full landed cost: production + logistics + tariffs under both scenarios (base case and anti-circumvention-duty case). 6. Walk the ground: parks, rents, utilities, and meetings with 2–3 operating peers in your sector. 7. Take local legal advice: investment incentives, procedures (IRC in Vietnam, BOI in Thailand, approvals in India), reporting duties. 8. Design for flexibility: can the plant raise localisation and redirect exports if US policy flips? 9. Consider the two-leg strategy at sufficient scale. 10. Refresh the scorecard quarterly — US tariff policy never stands still.

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FLAT Law Firm advises Chinese investors in Vietnam across the full lifecycle: investment structuring, IRC/ERC procedures, tax, labour, intellectual property and dispute resolution. Contact us for advice tailored to your case.

This article has been quality-reviewed by the FLAW AI Legal Council

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