The problem: when someone else’s tariffs become your cost
A coated-steel exporter in Hai Phong signed a long-term contract with a German partner in early 2026. Mid-year, the partner emailed: from now on, every shipment must carry “verified emissions data” because the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has entered its full application phase; without data, the partner would deduct the carbon-certificate cost straight from the purchase price. At the same time, a coffee exporter in the Central Highlands received a request from a Dutch buyer: provide the geolocation of every coffee lot for deforestation due diligence. Neither company is taxed directly by the EU — yet compliance costs and trade risks have landed on their shoulders.
The bigger picture: global trade tensions are escalating, with major economies trading retaliatory tariffs. The EU is no exception — it owns a complete trade-defence toolbox and is expanding into climate and environmental instruments with trade effects. Vietnamese businesses, whose supply chains are woven into global trade flows, need to understand these instruments and prepare contingency scenarios before the risk knocks.
Legal basis: the EU’s four layers of instruments
Layer 1 — Classic trade defence. The EU applies three WTO-based tools: anti-dumping under Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of 8 June 2016; anti-subsidy under Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of 8 June 2016; and safeguards under Regulation (EU) 2015/478. The point Vietnamese firms must watch closely is the anti-circumvention provision in the basic regulations: when goods hit by EU trade-defence duties are routed through Vietnam to reach the EU, the European Commission can open an anti-circumvention investigation and extend the duties to goods transiting Vietnam. At that point, Vietnamese companies must prove genuine processing in Vietnam — a question tied directly to origin files and production norms.
Layer 2 — The EVFTA bilateral safeguard. The EVFTA (in force since 1 August 2020) contains Chapter 7 on trade remedies, including a bilateral safeguard mechanism: where imports from Vietnam surge and cause or threaten serious injury to EU producers, the EU may temporarily apply safeguard measures. In other words, even inside the preference framework, a “safety valve” exists that the EU can trigger.
Layer 3 — CBAM: the carbon price becomes a trade cost. Regulation (EU) 2023/956 on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: a reporting-only transitional phase (1 October 2023–31 December 2025); from 1 January 2026 the full regime applies — the authorised CBAM declarant (the EU importer) must buy and surrender CBAM certificates matching the embedded emissions of imported goods, priced against EU Emissions Trading System auctions. Six product groups are currently covered: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. The first declaration for 2026 imports is due 30 September 2027. In 2025 the EU adopted a simplification package (Regulation (EU) 2025/2083): importers bringing in no more than 50 tonnes of covered goods per year are exempt — but an exemption for the EU importer does not end the Vietnamese exporter’s work, because large customers still demand emissions data. Keep the distinction clear: the six-group scope and declarant obligations are current law; the proposal to extend CBAM to around 180 downstream steel and aluminium product lines from 2028 is still policy in the making, not applicable law.
Layer 4 — EUDR: traceability down to the plot of land. Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 on deforestation (in force 29 June 2023) requires due diligence for seven commodity groups — cattle, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soy and wood — plus derived products such as wooden furniture. After two postponements of the application date (Regulation (EU) 2024/3234 and Regulation (EU) 2025/2650, adopted 19 December 2025), the current dates are 30 December 2026 for large and medium enterprises and small timber traders, and 30 June 2027 for remaining micro and small enterprises. The core duty: traceability to the geolocation of the production plot, a 31 December 2020 deforestation cut-off, and maximum fines of at least 4% of EU-wide turnover (Article 25(5) EUDR). For Vietnam, coffee, rubber and wooden furniture are the three directly affected groups.
Analysis: five scenarios Vietnamese businesses should plan for
Scenario 1 — An EU anti-circumvention investigation targeting goods routed through Vietnam. When a third country’s goods are hit with EU anti-dumping duties, trade flows tend to shift through third countries to “go around” them. If goods merely transit Vietnam or undergo only superficial processing before export to the EU, Vietnamese firms can be swept into an anti-circumvention case. The only defence is proving genuine production: complete origin files, material consumption norms, and value actually added in Vietnam. Pure toll manufacturers should be especially alert to “unusual” orders that spike suddenly.
Scenario 2 — Global tariff tensions push the EU to tighten trade defence. When major economies raise tariff walls against each other, displaced trade flows seek entry into the EU — and the EU has a tradition of answering with trade-defence investigations. The consequence for Vietnamese firms: investigation risk even when they are not the original target, simply because their exports to the EU are growing fast. Contingency: track your own sector’s export volumes to the EU quarterly; if growth spikes, proactively review pricing policies and cost records, because those are the first documents investigators request.
Scenario 3 — CBAM turns emissions data into a purchasing condition. For iron, steel, aluminium and fertiliser exports to the EU, the carbon cost has been real since 2026 — although the legal duty sits with the EU importer, the cost flows back to the exporter through lower prices or data demands. Firms that cannot measure their emissions get default values applied, usually less favourable than real figures. Contingency: start measuring and archiving energy and material data per production lot now; write CBAM cost-sharing clauses into contracts with EU customers instead of silently absorbing the cost.
Scenario 4 — EUDR blocks goods at the border for lack of traceability. From late 2026, coffee, rubber and wooden goods entering the EU must be covered by the importer’s deforestation due diligence — and the importer will demand geolocation and legality evidence from the Vietnamese exporter. Firms buying through many intermediaries face the hardest task. Contingency: redraw the supply-chain map down to the farming household or plantation; digitise purchasing records; for wooden goods, ensure raw timber is of legal, traceable origin — a requirement already familiar from other demanding markets.
Scenario 5 — The EU triggers the EVFTA bilateral safeguard. When a Vietnamese sector’s exports to the EU grow too fast, the EU may invoke the EVFTA’s bilateral safeguard to temporarily rebuild tariff walls. This is a sector-level risk, not a single-firm risk. Contingency at the industry-association level: monitor EU import statistics, keep dialogue with regulators, and diversify export markets so no single door carries everything.
Conclusion: three things to do now
EU trade defence and its “green” instruments are not news to read for interest — they are costs and risks already written into law with specific dates. Vietnamese businesses should do three things now: (i) build an early-warning system — assign someone to track EU trade-defence investigations touching their sector; (ii) standardise production records — origin, material norms, energy data — because these are the only “weapons” available when investigated or when customers demand data; (iii) put policy risk into contracts — CBAM cost-sharing clauses, EUDR data-supply clauses — instead of letting all the risk pool on one side. Preparing while the sun shines is the cheapest way to stay dry when it rains.
Note: this article is for general information, reflecting the law in force at the time of writing; policy developments under negotiation may change. Companies should check the authentic texts and consult a professional before making specific decisions.
Frequently asked questions
Does CBAM tax Vietnamese exporters directly?
No. The legal obligation sits with the authorised CBAM declarant — the EU importer — who must buy and surrender the carbon certificates. However, the cost flows back to the exporter through lower purchase prices or demands for verified emissions data. Exporters of iron, steel, aluminium and fertiliser to the EU should prepare emissions data now.
When does the EUDR apply, and which Vietnamese goods are affected?
Under Regulation (EU) 2025/2650 (adopted 19 December 2025), the EUDR applies from 30 December 2026 for large and medium enterprises and small timber traders, and from 30 June 2027 for remaining micro and small enterprises. For Vietnam, the three directly affected groups are coffee, rubber and wooden furniture (plus derived products). The core duty is traceability to the geolocation of the production plot and proof of no deforestation after the 31 December 2020 cut-off.
Can a Vietnamese company face an EU anti-dumping investigation even without dumping?
It can face an investigation — initiation rests on a complaint from EU industry and prima facie evidence, not a final finding. An investigated company with transparent cost and pricing records can be found not to dump, or face a low duty. That is why keeping complete accounting and production-cost records is the “insurance policy” for this scenario.
What does an EU anti-circumvention investigation mean for a toll manufacturer in Vietnam?
A great deal. If goods subject to EU trade-defence duties are channelled through Vietnam to circumvent them, the European Commission can open an anti-circumvention investigation and extend the duties to goods routed through Vietnam. Toll manufacturers must prove genuine production in Vietnam — origin files, material consumption norms and domestically created added value. Superficial processing or mere transit is the highest-risk pattern.
Does the EVFTA shield Vietnamese firms from EU safeguard measures?
Not fully. The EVFTA (Chapter 7, in force 1 August 2020) still allows the EU to apply a bilateral safeguard when imports from Vietnam surge and cause or threaten serious injury to EU producers. Tariff preferences and this “safety valve” exist side by side. Firms and industry associations should watch export volumes to the EU and diversify markets to reduce concentration risk.
This article is pending QA review by the FLAW AI Legal Council
Related articles
- Vietnamese Investors Acquiring EU Companies: EU Merger Regulation and the FDI Screening Net
- Environmental Permits for Factories in Vietnam and the US: One Unified System vs Two-Tier Federalism
- Forming a Company in Vietnam or the Netherlands: 1-Cent BV vs 'Zero-Dong' LLC
- EVIPA: The EU–Vietnam Investment Protection Deal — Signed but Not in Force
- Vietnam–US IP Protection: USPTO, ITC Section 337, and the 'Door-Shut' Order
